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Summary
Many observers have asserted that the reduced corporate tax rate instituted by the 2017 Tax Cuts and
Jobs Act (TCJA) has transformed entity choice for business owners, incentivizing owners of businesses
structured as sole proprietorships or passthrough entities to incorporate their businesses and to use
these new corporations as pocketbook investment vehicles to invest in and hold portfolio investments,
substantially reducing wealthy individuals’ tax obligations and Treasury’s tax collections. This brief offers
a different view, and discusses why predictions of widespread conversions to the corporate form at a
substantial cost to the fiscal position of the U.S. are overstated. The brief explores the various purported
tax advantages to incorporating, both when business owners are looking to invest substantial profits in
portfolio assets, as well as when retained earnings are reinvested in the business and produce ordinary
income.
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The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA), hastily passed by Congress and signed into law
by President Trump in December 2017, appears to have shifted business owners’
incentives.1
In particular, the TCJA seems to encourage owners of
successful businesses structured as sole proprietorships
or passthrough entities to incorporate their businesses.2 The advantage of owning a business through
corporation is said to stem from (1) the relatively low
corporate tax rate (21 percent), as compared with the
maximum personal tax rate on ordinary income (37
percent), and (2) the deferral of individual-level tax.
According to its critics, the TCJA will drive wealthy
business owners to restructure their businesses and
use their new corporations as pocketbook investment
vehicles to invest in and hold portfolio investments,
substantially reducing wealthy individuals’ tax obligations and Treasury’s tax collections.3
As a result of the TCJA, the long-held wisdom
that passthrough entities are tax advantaged relative to
subchapter C corporations is being questioned. And
business owners—encouraged by academics, commentators, and consultants—are seriously considering
converting their passthrough entities to corporations.
Recent articles that model choice of entity under
the TCJA further support the view that there will be
a large shift from the passthrough to the corporate
form.4 The choice of entity decision is now more
complicated and the consensus is that there are many

SUMMARY
• Many observers have asserted that the reduced corporate tax
rate instituted by the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act will incentivize owners of businesses structured as sole proprietorships or
passthrough entities to incorporate their businesses and use
these new corporations as pocketbook investment vehicles to
invest in and hold portfolio investments, substantially reducing
wealthy individuals’ tax obligations and Treasury’s tax collections.
• This brief offers a different view, and discusses why predictions of widespread conversions to the corporate form at a
substantial cost to the fiscal position of the U.S. are overstated.
• The brief explores the various purported tax advantages to
incorporating, both when business owners are looking to invest substantial profits in portfolio assets, as well as when
retained earnings are reinvested in the business and produce
ordinary income.
• Ultimately, for most businesses, the tax benefits from switching
from a passthrough entity to a C corporation are nonexistent,
speculative, or small. Consequently, tax collections are not likely
to change much from businesses switching to the corporate
form—at least for now. If certain provisions of the TCJA are not
extended by Congress in the coming years, the tax advantages
of incorporation could increase.
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situations in which the corporate form
would be tax preferred relative to a
passthrough structure.5
This Issue Brief—a synthesis of
two Tax Notes articles—takes a different position. Put simply, and in the
words of the Roman storyteller Phaedrus, “the first appearance deceives
many.” For several reasons discussed
in this brief, the general claim that
there will be a mass conversion of
passthrough entities into C corporations is, in fact, doubtful. Ultimately,
predictions of widespread conversions
to the corporate form at a substantial
cost to the fiscal position of the U.S.
are overstated.

THE TWO PRINCIPAL
SOURCES OF PRESUMED
ADVANTAGE FOR
INCORPORATING

tage for business owners to overcome
if they were going to use corporations
for tax deferral.
Once the TCJA provisions came
into effect, incorporation became
relatively more favorable. The total tax
rate on passthrough earnings is now
37 percent—the top individual tax
rate—down from 39.6 percent. The
total tax rate on corporate earnings
distributed immediately as dividends
is now 36.8 percent.6 Hence, when
all income is used for current consumption, the total tax burden on
income earned through corporate and
passthrough entities is now almost
equal, with the corporate form enjoying a tiny advantage.
This is illustrated in Table 1, which
assumes there is $1,000 of pretax
income going toward immediate con-

TABLE 1: CONSUMPTION WITH DIFFERENT ENTITIES
Passthrough Entity

1. RATE CHANGES

Under pre-2018 tax law, business owners had little tax incentive to
incorporate. The total tax on retained
earnings eventually distributed to
shareholders was 7.6 percentage
points higher than the tax on income
earned through passthrough entities.
That difference was a large disadvan-

sumption for a recipient in the top tax
bracket. When the taxpayer’s business
is a passthrough entity, the taxpayer
will be taxed on all $1,000 of earned
income. If the taxpayer receives a dividend, the corporation pays corporate
income tax, and then the dividend is
taxed to the individual recipient at
20 percent. The end result is that the
taxpayer who received a dividend can
spend only 0.31 percent more than
the taxpayer who owns a passthrough
entity. Alternatively, if the individual
is paid a $1,000 salary, the corporation
has no income and hence no corporate
income tax liability. The individual
who receives the salary pays income
tax and is left with the same amount
to spend as an owner of a passthrough
entity.
That doesn’t exhaust all possi-

No Section 199A

Section 199A

C Corporation
Dividend

Corporate income

$1,000

Corporate tax

$210

Salary

Individual income

$1,000

$1,000

$790

$1,000

Individual tax

$370

$296

$158

$370

Net consumption

$630

$704

$632

$630

11.75%

0.31%

0

Percentage difference

NOTES
1		 See, e.g.,

Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al., “The Games They Will
Play: Tax Games, Roadblocks and Glitches Under the House
and Senate Tax Bills” (Dec. 7, 2017).
2		 Some commentators emphasize that the post-TCJA balance between passthrough entities and C corporations
depends on a party’s circumstances. A list of references
is available in footnote 3 of Michael S. Knoll (2019), “The
TCJA and the Questionable Incentive to Incorporate,” Tax
Notes, Vol. 162, No. 9, pp. 977-986. That paper is the basis
of this Issue Brief, along with Michael S. Knoll (2019), “The
TCJA and the Questionable Incentive to Incorporate, Part

2,” Tax Notes, Vol. 162, No. 12, pp. 1447-1461.
e.g., Avi-Yonah et al., supra note 1.
4		 Penn Wharton Budget Model, (2018), “Projecting the Mass
Conversion from Pass-Through Entities to C-Corporations.”
5		 Supra note 2.
6		 This 36.8 percent figure is the sum of the 21 percent
corporate tax rate and 15.8 percent, which is the product
of the 20 percent individual tax rate and the 79 percent of
pretax earnings left in the corporation after payment of the
corporate tax.
7		 Section 199A(a). The provision is temporary through the
3		 See,

2

end of 2025.
QTB is any trade or business other than the performance
of services as an employee. Because holding portfolio
investments is not considered a trade or business, income
from portfolio investments is not eligible for the deduction.
9		 Section 1411 provides for a 3.8 percent surtax on net
investment income of certain high earners with substantial
investment income.
10		 Knoll, “Part 2,” supra note 2 (Table 3).
11		 Section 243 provides corporations with a 50 percent
dividends received deduction for dividends received from
8		 A

publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu

bilities, however, because the TCJA
created a new category of income
for tax purposes under the so-called
passthrough provision of section
199A. Among the most controversial
provisions of the TCJA, section 199A
gives owners of unincorporated businesses a 20 percent deduction on their
qualified business income (QBI).7
For an individual in the top tax
bracket, the section 199A deduction
can reduce the marginal tax rate by
7.4 percentage points, from 37 percent
to 29.6 percent. The section 199A
deduction is unavailable to employees
and corporations, but it is available
to sole proprietorships and owners of
passthrough entities that are qualified
trades or businesses (QTBs).8
For taxpayers who can take
advantage of the section 199A
deduction, a passthrough entity can
deliver substantially more consumption than can a corporation. In Table
1, a top-bracket owner of a successful passthrough entity who can take
full advantage of section 199A can
consume 11.75 percent more than
can a passthrough entity without the
deduction.

lent argument for incorporation.
When a portion of income is saved
and invested, the corporate form
appears more tax-friendly than the
passthrough form, since the personal
tax on long-term capital gains and
qualified dividends can be deferred,
possibly indefinitely, within a corporation. Although the principal and
income will be taxed later, in the
interim the additional money that
would have gone to pay taxes immediately with a passthrough entity can be
invested through the corporation and
earn a return. The after-tax portion of
that return is said to be the source of
the tax advantage from incorporation.
However, there is actually a small
disadvantage to using a corporation rather than a passthrough entity
(without a section 199A deduction)
as a vehicle to invest in portfolio
assets, as illustrated in Table 2. Table 2
shows the amount of money a business owner can spend in 10 years
from $1,000 of pretax income that is
invested at a 10 percent annual pretax
rate of return. It assumes that all
investment income is taxed at the end
of 10 years when the investment will
be liquidated.
This small disadvantage is an
important and surprising point.
Despite a relatively long holding

2. DEFERRAL

Because it can be quite valuable, deferral drives the most preva-

period and a relatively high rate of
return, the initial larger investment
fund with a C corporation still does
not yield a larger amount available
for consumption. That result directly
conflicts with claims about the TCJA’s
incorporation incentive, and it probably conflicts with the intuition of
many tax specialists.
The explanation, however, is simple. The imposition of the 21 percent
corporate tax on investment income
almost exactly offsets the benefit of
the deferred 20 percent individuallevel tax when investment income is
earned through the corporation. With
earnings taxed twice—once at the
corporate level and then later at the
individual level—the deferral benefit
disappears.
At current tax rates, there are
(roughly) no differences in the tax
burdens of different organizational
forms, assuming the section 199A
deduction is unavailable. Accordingly,
successful professionals and wealthy
business owners cannot substantially
reduce their tax burdens by converting their passthrough businesses to
corporations, regardless of whether
all income is paid out as earned or
some income is reinvested in portfolio
assets.

NOTES
firms where the recipient has an ownership share below
20 percent.
12		 Although historically dividends have accounted for more
than two-fifths of total return, in the 2010s dividends have
so far accounted for much less, about one-sixth of total
return. Ben Reynolds, “S&P 500 Dividend Yield: Past, Present, Future,” Sure Dividend, Aug. 9, 2018.
13		 Section 1014 provides as a general rule that the basis of
property received from a decedent is the fair market value
of the property at the time of the decedent’s death (or the
alternate valuation date).

Section 1202.
Knoll, “Part 2,” supra note 2.
16		 Ibid. For the full analysis, see section IV.
17		 The TCJA provides a general allowance of expenditures for
businesses regardless of size. Under section 179, small
and medium-size businesses can deduct up to $1 million
a year before having to capitalize and depreciate their investment expenditures. And through 2022, section 168(k)
allows all businesses to take 100 percent bonus depreciation on most investments other than real estate, which also
produces an immediate deduction.
14		
15		

3

E.g., Joseph Bankman, “Silicon Valley Start-Ups,” 41
UCLA L. Rev. 1737 (1994); Victor Fleischer, “The Rational
Exuberance of Structuring Venture Capital Start-Ups,” 57
Tax L. Rev. 137 (2003); Larry Ribstein, The Rise of the
Uncorporation 13 (2010); and Gregg D. Polsky and Adam
Rosenzweig, “The Up-C Revolution,” 71 Tax L. Rev. 415
(2018).
19		 The incorporations of private equity companies KKR
and Ares Capital post-TCJA are prominent examples of
passthrough businesses incorporating not to reduce their
taxes, but rather doing so to better access capital because
18		
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TABLE 2: ALL INVESTMENT INCOME IS TAX DEFERRED
Passthrough Entity

Investment grows to

No Section 199A

Section 199A

Dividend

Salary

$1,634.06

$1,825.99

$2,049.06

$2,049.06

Corporate tax
Payment (not grossed up)

C Corporation

$264.40
$1,634.06

$1,825.99

$1,784.64

Payment (grossed up)
Dividend/investment tax

$2,259.06
$200.81

$224

$365.93

Ordinary tax
Net consumption

$1,000

$835.85
$1,433.25

FOUR OTHER (POTENTIAL)
TAX ADVANTAGES OF
INCORPORATING
Other tax provisions could still
make the corporate form more tax
efficient when business owners are
looking to invest substantial proceeds
in portfolio investments. Although
none of these provisions are likely
to yield large tax advantages from
incorporation, here are four possible
sources of advantage:
1. THE MEDICARE TAX

Corporations—unlike highbracket taxpayers —are not subject
to the 3.8 percent Medicare tax.9
The Medicare tax is imposed on a
corporation only when it pays wages
to its employees or dividends to its

$1,601.60

$1,427.72

$1,423.21

shareholders (or when shareholders
sell their shares and realize capital
gains). Unlike the previous result
with income taxes—in which the tax
benefit from deferring the individual
income tax was almost exactly offset
by the corporate tax on the income
from retained earnings—there is no
Medicare tax imposed at the corporate
level that would eliminate the benefit
from using a corporation to defer the
Medicare tax. Therefore, because of
the Medicare tax, there is a modest tax
benefit from incorporation and investing retained earnings, and it is quantifiable. The amount that a taxpayer
(who cannot take advantage of the
section 199A deduction) can consume after 10 years is slightly higher,
between 2 and 4.4 percent, when the
investment earns 10 percent annually

NOTES
the tax costs of converting are minimal, if any. Joshua
Franklin, “Private equity firm KKR opts to become C-Corp
after U.S. tax reform,” Reuters, May 3, 2018.
20		 Only in special circumstances (such as owners planning
to hold large amounts of high-dividend, high-interest,
low-capital gains assets until death) will switching from a
passthrough entity to a C corporation likely lead to a large
reduction in taxes.

4

and is made through a corporation.10
2. INTEREST AND DIVIDENDS

Corporations are taxed at lower
rates than individuals on some forms
of investment income. For example, on
interest income, corporations are taxed
at the corporate rate of 21 percent,
whereas individuals are taxed at ordinary income rates of up to 37 percent.
Further, corporations that hold shares
in other corporations are eligible for
a dividends received deduction of up
to 50 percent.11 Regarding interest
income, however, corporations and
high-bracket investors are rarely the
proper tax clientele for taxable bonds.
And as for the dividends received
deduction, dividends have accounted
for only a small portion of the total
return from holding stocks in recent
years,12 thereby reducing the tax benefit from investing in stocks through a
corporation.
3. STEP-UP IN BASIS

The step-up in basis at death can
eliminate the individual-level tax on
both business profits and investment
income.13 The effect of the step-up
is to wipe out the decedent’s accumulated capital gain upon her death. But
in general, it is not clear whether the
tax benefit from the step-up in basis
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at death is greater with passthrough
entities or with C corporations. The
value of the step-up on unrealized
income is greater with passthrough
entities than with corporations.
Conversely, the potential tax saving on
realized income is greater with corporations than with passthrough entities.
The answer in any specific case likely
depends on the party’s circumstances.
4. QSBS EXCLUSION

A final proffered rationale for
favoring C corporations is the qualified small business stock (QSBS)
exclusion, which allows individual
taxpayers to exclude from federal tax
100 percent of their gain on the sale
of qualified corporations’ shares.14
However, because the exclusion and
the incorporation incentive it creates
precede the TCJA businesses seeking to take advantage of the deduction were likely already C corporations before the TCJA was enacted.
Moreover, the QSBS exclusion does
not make a corporation an effective
vehicle for portfolio investments; it
actually has the opposite effect.15

REINVESTING IN THE
BUSINESS
The discussion thus far has
focused on situations in which business owners invest some of their
profits in portfolio assets. If, however,
a business’s owners were to plow their
earnings back into the business in a
way that produced ordinary income,
the tax benefits from incorporation
would appear to increase substantially.
This is because the 20 percent investment tax on dividends replaces the

individual-level ordinary income tax
with rates as high as 37 percent.
Assuming, again, a 10-year holding period and a 10 percent annual
rate of return, the benefits potentially
available from using a corporation
rather than a passthrough entity when
retained earnings are reinvested in
the business and produce ordinary
income are large—as high as 16.4 to
22.4 percent.16 This suggests that the
strongest case for using a corporation post-TCJA is not as a corporate
pocketbook to reinvest earnings in
portfolio investments, but rather as
a vehicle to reinvest earnings in the
business when the business’s owners
cannot take the section 199A deduction and the reinvestment produces
ordinary income.
However, even here there might
not be an advantage from incorporating. Implicit in the discussion of the
tax benefit from reinvesting is that
the reinvested proceeds generate some
immediate tax liability, whether the
reinvestment occurs through a corporation or a passthrough entity. As
is widely recognized, an immediate
deduction of the full amount invested
is equivalent to exempting the return
on that investment from tax—regardless of the tax rate—assuming that the
tax rate is constant (and making some
other common assumptions). Accordingly, for there to be a tax benefit
from incorporating, the reinvested
expenditures cannot be immediately
deductible.
But under current law, most
expenditures are immediately deductible for many businesses.17 Therefore,
at least for now, there is only a very
small (1.69 percent) tax advantage

5

from using the corporation to reinvest
profits in a business, even if that reinvestment produces ordinary income.
This is illustrated in Table 3 (which
includes the Medicare tax).

WHICH BUSINESSES WILL
CONVERT?
The two most salient questions
remain: what kinds of businesses are
most likely to be converted into C
corporations, and how large of an
impact will those conversions have on
tax collections? As for the first question:
• Business owners who can take
the section 199A deduction will probably pay substantially higher taxes if
they incorporate.
• Those who consume all income
as it is earned will see only a small
decrease in their taxes from incorporating, most of which will come from
the corporate tax being excluded from
the Medicare tax base.
• Business owners who invest a
portion of their income in portfolio
assets will likely be only slightly better
off by incorporating. However, the
deferral of the individual tax from
investing retained profits in portfolio assets will not generate any tax
savings. Again, the advantage comes
from the Medicare tax. And for businesses with multiple owners, there
would be pressure for all the owners
to save through the corporation in
proportion to their share ownership
and for all shareholders to have the
same investment portfolio.
• Similarly, the owners of profitable businesses that reinvest in the
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business and produce ordinary income
are only slightly better off owning
their businesses through corporations
because of the current widespread availability of immediate expensing for busi-

or rely heavily on equity-based compensation. In other words, businesses
with ambitious growth goals tend to be
incorporated even if there is a substantial tax cost for doing so. For these

FINAL THOUGHTS

TABLE 3: REINVESTMENT WITH IMMEDIATE EXPENSING
Passthrough Entity
No Section 199A

Section 199A

Corporation
Dividend

Salary

Net investment

$1,000

$1,000

$1,000

$1,000

Grows to

$2,593.74

$2,593.74

$2,593.74

$2,593.74

Corporate tax

$544.69

Dividend tax

$487.68

Ordinary tax

$1,058.25

$866.31

Net consumption

$1,535.50

$1,727.43

$1,561.38

$1,535.50

12.50%

1.69%

0%

Percentage difference

ness investments, which defers taxation
until distribution. However, as 100
percent bonus depreciation—a feature
that is equivalent to immediate expensing—phases out and is eliminated, the
potential benefits from incorporation to
businesses that reinvest their earnings
in the business increase.
• Finally, there is a tax risk from
incorporation that must also be considered. If a corporate payment is taxed
as compensation (not as a distribution)
and the corporation does not have taxable income that can be offset by the
payment, the corporate form can be at
a large tax disadvantage relative to the
passthrough form. That is because the
ordinary tax on the payment is not partially offset by the corporation’s deduction.
Despite these findings, businesses
historically have had a tendency to
adopt the corporate form even when a
passthrough entity is more tax efficient.18 That tendency appears to be
especially strong for businesses that are
looking to raise venture capital funding

more taxpayers would stand to benefit
from incorporation if the section 199A
deduction disappears at the end of 2025
and as bonus depreciation phases out,
unless those provisions are extended.

$1,058.25

businesses, the TCJA likely lowers the
tax disadvantage. Since many of these
companies are already incorporated,
however, it is not clear that many businesses that would have continued (or
started) as passthrough entities if the
old tax law had remained in place will
incorporate.19 Under these circumstances, and in response to the second
question, tax collections are not likely to
change much from businesses switching
to the corporate form.
Ultimately, for most businesses
the tax benefits from switching from
a passthrough entity to a C corporation are nonexistent, speculative, or
small.20 Accordingly, despite being
unable to offer numerical estimates, it is
hard to see the TCJA causing a rush to
incorporate and a substantial loss of tax
revenue—at least for now. If, however,
Congress does not extend the current
37 percent top tax rate for top-bracket
taxpayers, the benefit of incorporation would rise from 0.2 percent to 2.8
percent (without taking into account
the Medicare tax) in 2026. In addition,
6

In the current tax environment,
which was created by the TCJA, small
differences can shift the balance in
favor of one form of entity over another.
Accordingly, business owners seeking
to choose the most tax-efficient entity
need to know more than ever before;
they cannot simply fixate on one or two
factors. They are compelled to try to
predict the future, too. The challenge
in making the incorporation decision
stems from the fact that the corporate
tax benefits are quantifiable, while the
tax benefits of a sole proprietorship,
for example, are based on difficult-tomodel anticipations of future realities—
both in terms of the owners’ income
and investment opportunities and
changes in the tax law.
As a result of the TCJA, which
brought the tax consequences of
passthrough entities and corporations
closer together, the game of identifying the most tax-efficient structure to
use for a successful business is afoot.
However, given the modest tax benefits
potentially available to many firms in a
wide range of circumstances, the game
might not be worth the candle.
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